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Abstract
The paper asks whether diagrams in mathematics are particularly fruitful
compared to other types of representations. In order to respond to this ques-
tion a number of examples of propositions and their proofs are considered. In
addition I use part of Peirce’s semiotics to characterise different types of signs
used in mathematical reasoning, distinguishing between symbolic expressions
and 2-dimensional diagrams. As a starting point I examine a proposal by
Danielle Macbeth (2014). Macbeth explains how it can be that objects “pop
up”, e.g., as a consequence of the constructions made in the diagrams of
Euclid, that is, why they are fruitful. It turns out, however, that diagrams
are not exclusively fruitful in this sense. By analysing the proofs given in
the paper I introduce the notion of a ‘faithful representation’. A faithful
representation represents as either an image (resembling what it stands for)
or as a metaphor (sharing some underlying structure). Secondly it represents
certain relevant relations (that is, as an iconic diagram in Peirce’s terminol-
ogy). Thirdly manipulations on the representations respect manipulations
on the objects they represent, so that new relations may be found. The ex-
amples given in the paper illustrate how such representations can be fruitful.
These examples include proofs based on both symbolic expressions as well
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as diagrams and so it seems diagrams are not special when it comes to fruit-
fulness. Having said this, I do present two features of diagrams that seem to
be unique. One consists of the possibility of exhibiting the type of relation
in a diagram — or simply showing that a relation exists — as a contrast
to stating in words that it exists. The second is the spatial configurations
possible when using diagrams, e.g., allowing to show multiple relations in a
single diagram.
1 Introduction
This paper explores the role of diagrams in mathematics in particular re-
garding their capacity to point to new results. The main question to be
addressed is whether diagrams are unique in some way in this respect, and
— if this is the case — to search for an explanation for why it is so. In
order to investigate this question I consider diagrams as a certain type of
representation and compare them with other types of representations to be
explained. The notions of ‘pointing to new results’ or ‘fruitful’ will not be
taken in any dramatic sense. It has been proposed that visualisation is some-
times remarkably fruitful, for example referring to the work of Riemann, see
Tappenden (2005). Here I consider only results where, e.g. new objects are
constructed or relations between concepts are found. My hope is that an
understanding of how the signs work in these simpler cases may be of use
when explaining what goes on also in the other more exceptional ones. The
objects of study will consist of a number of different examples of proofs (and
their corresponding propositions) in order to examine which role the different
types of representations play. The conclusion of these investigations is that
in many respects diagrams do not differ from other types of representations.
I will make a case that other types of representations also fulfil certain prop-
erties put forward to explain the fruitfulness of diagrams. Having said this I
do point to a couple of features of diagrams that seem advantageous for our
understanding.
Even though diagrams — or figures — have been used in mathematics
throughout times, for the last hundred years or so the reference to them
in mathematical reasoning has been discredited. In order to explain this
development scholars have often referred to statements by Hilbert or Pasch,
such as the following:
For the appeal to a figure is, in general, not at all necessary. It does
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facilitate essentially the grasp of the relations stated in the theorem and the
constructions applied in the proof. Moreover, it is a fruitful tool to discover
such relationships and constructions. However, if one is not afraid of the
sacrifice of time and effort involved, then one can omit the figure in the proof
of any theorem; indeed, the theorem is only truly demonstrated if the proof
is completely independent of the figure. (Pasch, 1882/1926, 43). (Quote and
translation from Mancosu 2005.)
When discussing rigour of proofs the focus is most often on the first sentence
in combination with the last three-four lines. I wish to emphasise the three
points made in the middle. Firstly that a diagram is a fruitful tool to dis-
cover new results. Secondly that it ‘facilitates the grasp of the statement
of the proposition and constructions made’, in other words it contributes to
understanding; and finally that a diagram may represent relations.
I am mainly interested in stating something about diagrams used in con-
temporary mathematics, but my starting point will concern diagrams used
in Euclid’s Elements or Greek mathematics in general. The main reason for
this is to take advantage of some of the detailed studies that have been made
on, in particular, Euclid’s diagrams. The first task, therefore, is to estab-
lish that some — but not all — of the roles diagrams in Greek mathematics
have been noted to play can be transferred to contemporary examples. The
first section, then, considers some of the roles diagrams have been stated to
play in Greek mathematics. In this part Reviel Netz’s claim that diagrams
are metonyms for propositions and Philip Catton’s and Clemency Montelle’s
statement that they are “metonyms for an epiphany” will be compared with
a contemporary example. It will be noted that this example plays similar
cognitive roles but differ in other respects to be explained.
Having found that there are uses of diagrams that cut across history, I
move in the second part to investigate whether diagrams — compared to
other types of representations — are unique in some respects. The second
part considers a proposal made by Danielle Macbeth pertaining to the fruit-
fulness of Euclidean diagrams and notes that proofs not based on figures
exemplify the same features. Macbeth commences her paper on Euclidean
diagrams by expressing the hope that a detailed understanding of the Eu-
clidean practice may contribute to further understanding also in later prac-
tices. This accords well with the just mentioned conclusion: “My aim is to
clarify the nature of this practice in hopes that it might ultimately teach us
something about the nature of mathematical practice generally. Perhaps if we
better understand the first (and for almost the whole of the long history of the
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science of mathematics the only) systematic and fruitful mathematical prac-
tice, we will be better placed to understand later developments.” (Macbeth
2010, p. 236).
Macbeth bases the fruitfulness of diagrams on the observation that ob-
jects “pop up” as a consequence of the constructions made. She gives two
explanations for the fact that this is possible: The first is due to alternative
readings of the involved representations of geometric objects, such as line
segments. The second item states it is possible to identify 3 ‘levels of ar-
ticulation’ in the diagrams enabling the multiple readings. Macbeth (2014)
furthermore illustrates that objects pop up and that alternative readings are
also used in mathematical reasoning in general. Her (historical) examples
include reasoning as described by Kant and a derivation of Euler’s formula.
Macbeth’s last and most elaborated example of objects popping up in a non-
diagrammatic proof is taken from Frege’s concept-script.
In the final section, based on the examples presented throughout the pa-
per, I introduce one type of representation, denoted a ‘faithful representation’
that seems to hold a key for explaining fruitfulness. An important property
of a faithful representation is that it can be manipulated in a way, so that
new relations may be discovered. In addition I point to two features of 2-
dimensional diagrams that seem to be advantageous for our understanding
— and so indirectly for fruitfulness in case one takes understanding as a
prerequisite for the further development of mathematics. The first has to do
with the spatial configurations possible when using diagrams. In diagrams,
exploiting the two-dimensionality of a page, the same sign can be part of
different (representations of) objects, but need only be drawn once. We shall
see that this is the case in Euclid I.1 where a single line segment is both the
radii of two different circles and the base line of a triangle. In contrast we
may use a single letter to stand for an object in a textual argument but the
letter will be placed at different places on the page for each time the object is
referred to. My proposal is that placing a sign or object only in one place in
the diagram and showing which relations it has to the other objects displayed
provides a cognitive advantage.
The second suggestion is based on what was emphasised above, namely
that a diagram displays relations. One may draw a diagram composed of e.g.
letters (standing for some objects) and lines between these letters suggesting
that objects connected are related in some way. This allows us to show that
the objects are related, but not necessarily expressing how they are related.
In the examples to be presented we shall see that sometimes the intended
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relations can be read off directly from the diagram whereas in other cases
a connecting line simply illustrates that some relation holds between the
objects. In particular in the last case symbols and other types of signs makes
it possible to state which relation(s) is at stake. My proposal is that the
advantage of some diagrams consists in a capacity to show the relation as
compared to text or symbolic expressions simply stating that a relation holds.
1.1 Peirce on icons, indices and symbols
Because of the references to be made to Peirce’s theory of signs I need to
make some notes about terminology. According to Peirce ‘diagram’ refers to
the (iconic) sign that represents relations. In order to avoid confusion I will
use the term ‘diagramP ’ when this meaning is intended. I will continue to
use ‘diagram’ in its ordinary sense referring to certain (2-dimensional) visual
representations composed of lines and sometimes letters standing for math-
ematical objects. Sometimes, as did Pasch, I will use ‘figure’ or ‘geometric
figure’ as well.
In general Peirce takes a representation or sign to be one of three com-
ponents of an irreducible triadic relation. In addition to the sign itself it
consists of the object the sign stands for and the interpretation of the sign.
I will make use of his icons, indices and symbols. When referring to these
one asks how a sign accomplishes to refer to, or stand for, an object.1 An
icon is a sign that represents because it resembles, or holds some kind of
likeness, to the object represented. According to Peirce there are three ways
in which ‘likeness’ can be understood, see table 1. The simplest is when the
sign resembles what it represents, as in an image. Example of iconic images
are drawn pictures and geometric figures. Second the sign may show certain
relations. Such a sign Peirce denotes a diagram, or an iconic diagram. Note
that on this understanding ‘a diagram’ may also refer to, for example, an
algebraic formula as long as it is read as expressing a relation. As an exam-
ple take the identity a2 + b2 = c2 that expresses a particular relation holding
between the sides of a right-angled triangle. Peirce writes the following: “In
fact, every algebraical equation is an icon, in so far as it exhibits, by means
of the algebraic signs (which are not themselves icons), the relations of the
quantities concerned”(CP 2.282, italic in original).2 As noted above I will
1Conversely icons, indices and symbols can be taken as the different possibilities of an
object to act on a sign so that the sign may be taken to represent it.
2(CP 2.282) refers to paragraph 282 in the second volume of Peirce’s Collected Papers
5
Table 1: Different types of icons
icon type of likeness
image resembling
diagram showing relations
metaphor underlying rules or
structural similarity
refer to icons representing relations as ‘diagramP ’.
Finally an icon may represent by ‘parallelism in something else’ (CP
2.277) in which case it is called a metaphor.3 Peirce writes: “Particularly
deserving of notice are icons in which the likeness is aided by conventional
rules. Thus, an algebraic formula is an icon, rendered such by the rules of
commutation, association, and distribution of the symbols. ... For a great
distinguishing property of the icon is that by the direct observation of it other
truths concerning its object can be discovered”(CP 2.279). A simple example
is that for real numbers, a, b, (a + b)2 is seen to be an icon of a2 + b2 + 2ab
(or vice versa) because of the laws holding for operations on real numbers.
The identity between the two expressions indicate they share some kind of
likeness. This likeness does not hold because they look alike, that is they
are not images. Neither do they represent the same relation. The only way
to see that the expressions are alike is to use the properties of real numbers
(distributive and commutative law) and the convention that a2 = a·a. So the
likeness is what Peirce refers to as metaphorical. I will give further examples
of all three kinds of icons throughout the paper.
Since mathematics deals extensively with relations, the use of diagramsP ,
in the sense of representations of relations, abounds. Note that referring
to the diagrams used in Euclid’s Elements as ‘diagramsP ’, makes sense also
on this interpretation. Instead of taking them to be images or pictures of
the geometric figures (squares, triangles, circles etc.), when reasoning it is
the relations between various points (denoted by letters) and other geometric
objects that are relevant. Take the example of a circle. What we should note
when seeing a circle is not (only) its form. When reasoning it is particularly
relevant to note the special relation that holds between any point on the
edited by Hartshorne and Weiss listed as (Peirce 1965-1967) in the bibliography.
3Carter (2012a, forthcoming) gives further examples of how metaphors are used in
mathematics.
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circumference and the centre of the circle, namely that the distance between
them is constant — a property used in, for example, Proposition I.1.
An index, as it is used in mathematics, is a sign that for some purpose is
associated with a certain object without saying anything about the object.4
We use an index when we wish to reason about, say, a function calling it ‘f’.
Peirce gives as an example the geometricians’ use of letters placed next to
various points in figures to stand for these points, allowing them to reason
about the points.
The last type of sign is the symbol. A symbol represents because of some
law fixing the reference of the sign. Symbols used in mathematics are for
example, ·, pi and +. In this paper I will use the term ‘symbolic expression’
to denote an expression, or relation, composed of symbols. An example is
the expression a · b = b · a stating that multiplication is commutative for a
and b by using the symbols · and =. A last — but important — thing to note
is that signs often are composed of other signs and that a sign may represent
in different ways, that is, it could represent both as, e.g., a symbol and as
an icon. An example of a compound sign is the iconic diagramP a · b = 1
(e.g., for a, b ∈ Q) which has both indexical and symbolic parts. As a whole
it states that a and b are multiplicative inverses of each other. a and b act as
indices, referring to numbers, and the relation is expressed using the symbols
· and =.
2 Diagrams in Greek mathematics
In the Shaping of Deduction Netz argues that the diagrams used in Greek
mathematics are metonyms for propositions. One component of this charac-
terisation consists of the documented interdependence between the text and
diagram. Note that this point — as well as many others — is also stressed
by Ken Manders (2008/1995). In order to argue for the dependence of the
diagram Netz conducts a detailed study on how specification of letters is
4In a paper published in 1885 Peirce characterises an index as follows: “the sign [index]
signifies its object solely by virtue of being really connected with it. Of this nature are
all natural signs and physical symptoms. I call such a sign an index . . . The index asserts
nothing; it only says ‘There!” It takes hold of our eyes, as it were, and forcibly directs
them to a particular object, and there it stops. Demonstrative and relative pronouns are
nearly pure indices, because they denote things without describing them; so are the letters
on a geometric diagram, and the subscript numbers which in algebra distinguish one value
from another without saying what those values are”(CP 3.361).
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accomplished in Greek mathematical texts, that is, how one comes to learn
what the letters used stand for. One important finding is the use of letters,
whose reference is not given by the text. Such letters are only fixed by the
accompanying diagram. Netz introduces various types of categories of let-
ters, one being being ‘completely unspecified’ which means it is not possible
to recover from the text alone which point the letter stands for. Netz bases
the claim that the demonstration is dependent on the accompanying diagram
by counting the number of occurrences of letters in these categories finding
(for Euclid book XIII) that 19% of the occurrences are completely unspec-
ified (p. 23). The conclusion is that the diagram is required in order to
fix reference in these cases. In addition Netz finds that information used in
demonstrations is extracted from diagrams. Below is an example (Elements
proposition II.11) where information used in a demonstration is read off of
a diagram. Reversely Netz argues that the text is not recoverable from the
diagram, concluding that the diagram and text are interdependent.
Besides the above conclusion, that the diagram is a necessary compo-
nent of certain demonstrations in Greek mathematics, Netz bases the claim
that a diagram is a metonym for the proposition on an analysis of the use
of the word ‘diagram’ in Greek texts. He finds, for example, that Aristotle
uses the word ‘diagram’ to refer to the proposition. The Greeks never seem
to use ‘diagramma’ (or similar) to refer to the accompanying geometric fig-
ure. Instead a number of different words are being used non systematically.
Referring to the figure, they could use, for example katagraphe — the ‘draw-
ing’. Secondly Netz observes that the diagram is unique to the proposition:
“The overwhelming rule in Greek mathematics is that propositions are indi-
viduated by their diagrams”(p. 38). This leads to the conclusion that the
‘diagram is a metonym for the proposition’ (p. 37).
Catton and Montelle in their To diagram, to demonstrate: To do, to
see, and to judge in Greek geometry also start out with an analysis of the
meaning of ‘diagram’ in the context of Greek geometry. They note it can act
both as a verb and a noun. As a verb it designates “concerted manual steps
that in the end allow something to be seen. These steps also allow concepts
to be formed or clarified that may then ultimately allow clear things to
be said”(Catton and Montelle 2012, p. 25). As a noun it might mean a
number of things, but most often “the figure provided with the text”(p.
26). Other meanings could be (here freely reproduced from their text) i)
the set of marks necessary in order to follow the demonstration ii) the set
of marks required in order to understand the proposition or iii) the set of
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marks produced in order to perform the construction that the proposition
states is possible (p. 25).5 One of their points is that a diagram satisfying
any one of these descriptions would look quite different from one constructed
to satisfy another — and that the diagram chosen has to balance each of
these objectives. They further show that the figure provided with the text
does not show the actual constructions performed; rather it “brings to mind
better what the proposition embodies...the diagram helps us call to mind
the demonstration, and still more importantly, helps us better intuit what it
is, practically, that is proposed to be done”(p. 37). Furthermore they note
Plato’s fascination with the duality of timelessness and temporality and so,
taking the various meanings into account, they claim the diagram combines
the temporality of moving about in the diagram following the demonstration
with the timelessness of the insight thereby obtained - and so claim the
diagram is a metonym for an epiphany.
To sum up I have pointed to the following roles diagrams play in Euclid’s
Elements (or Greek mathematics):
1. They are metonyms for propositions. This could mean a number of
different things, including that a diagram individuates the given propo-
sition (as indicated by Netz), it helps recollecting the formulation of
the proposition and it indicates the constructions to be made to prove
the proposition (as proposed by Catton and Montelle).
2. Furthermore the proof depends on the diagram, features of diagrams
are used in the proofs as pointed out by Netz (1999) and (Manders
2008).
3. The diagram is a metonym for an epiphany. Moving about in the
diagram, following the instructions made in the text, one comes to see
that the proposition holds.
5In order to explain the various meanings of a diagram as a noun I give a couple
of examples from Euclid’s Elements. If the purpose of the diagram was to illustrate
the statement of the proposition of, e.g., proposition I.1 (see figure 5), a drawing of an
equilateral triangle would suffice. Note also that the shown diagram most often do not
show how the marked points would actually be constructed. In order to, for example,
divide a line segment in two one needs to draw both circles shown in figure 5 and a line
joining their intersection points. In Euclid proposition II.11 (figure 1) the line segment AC
is divided in two in the point named E, but the diagram does not show how to construct
it. Instead the diagram mainly shows the geometric figures and points necessary to follow
the demonstration.
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I illustrate these points by an example from Euclid. I find that Euclid’s
Elements proposition II.11 — also used as example by Catton and Montelle
— illustrates these points well.
The accompanying figure is the following:
C K D
E
A H B
F G
Figure 1. The diagram of Euclid’s Elements proposition II.11.
Focussing first on the line AB in this diagram6, divided in the point H,
and second the geometric figures thereby obtained, allows recollecting the
formulation of the proposition:
To cut a given straight line so that the rectangle contained by the whole and
one of the segments is equal to the square on the remaining segment.
Using the letters given in the diagram the proposition can be stated as
follows. The line AB is cut in H so that the square on AH is equal to the
rectangle formed by HB and BD.7
The diagram furthermore helps recollecting the constructions made in
order to follow the demonstration. The line AC is cut in half giving a point
E, a straight line connects this point with B, producing EB. AC is extended
to F so that EF is equal to EB. The final step is to produce the square
on AF and extend the line GH to K. The proposition then states that the
square on AH is equal to the rectangle formed by HB and BD.
I omit details of the first part of the proof. It consists in using proposition
II.6 - observing that the figure contains a straight line that is divided in half
6Following Euclidean tradition the diagram is lettered following the alphabet, indicating
that the “given” is the line AB.
7One is supposed to note that ABCD is a square, so that AB=BD.
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and then extended.8 Next an instance of I.47 “Pythagoras’ theorem” is
applied, noticing that ABE is a right angled triangle. Combining these two
results one obtains that the rectangle formed by FC and AH is equal to the
square formed on AB. Looking at the figure one sees that they have the
rectangle formed by AH and AC in common. (In the English translation
Heath simply writes “Let AK be subtracted from each” (Euclid 1956, p.
403).) If this is removed, the result follows.
As claimed above, the diagram plays a number of roles in this proposition.
It helps recalling the formulation of the proposition, it points to constructions
as well as steps to be made to go through the demonstration. One even
reads off properties of the diagram, used in the demonstration. Finally, as
argued by Catton and Montelle, performing the constructions indicated by
the diagram and following the steps of the demonstration should move one
into a timeless insight.
My next aim is to investigate which of these roles diagrams in contem-
porary mathematics play. The example to be presented is chosen because
it plays some of the above articulated roles. It is taken from (Haagerup
and Thorbjørnsen, 1999). It concerns permutations that can be pictured by
drawing lines between points placed on a circle as in figure 2 below. Recall
that a permutation, pi ∈ Sp is a bijection on the set {1, 2, . . . , p}. In this
case we further require that pi(i) 6= i and that pi2(j) = j. The figure below
— figure 2 — shows the permutation that in two-cycles can be written as
(12)(36)(45).9
8Euclid II.6 states that: If a straight line be bisected and a straight line be added to it
in a straight line, the rectangle contained by the whole with the added straight line and the
added straight line together with the square on the half is equal to the square on the straight
line made up on the half and the added straight line. Given such long statements without
using any letters as cognitive fix-points also points to a role that the geometric figures
must play. The parts of the figure, that is, the line segments and the various mentioned
figures (squares or rectangles), may serve as the units that the statement is about.
9A permutation pi = (12)(36)(45) means that the element 1 is mapped to 2, 2 is mapped
to 1, 3 is mapped to 6 and so on. See also figure 2.
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Figure 2. A representation of a permutation on {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}.
We need two further definitions. A permutation, pi on {1, 2, . . . , p} is
said to have crossings or be a crossing permutation if it is the case for some
numbers, a < b < c < d in the set {1, 2, . . . , p} that pi(a) = c and pi(b) = d.
If such a permutation is represented as before, the line joining a and c and
the line joining b and d will cross. If the permutation does not fulfil this
property, it is said to be non-crossing. The permutation in figure 2 is non-
crossing. Figure 3 represents a crossing permutation.
If a number i in {1, 2, . . . , p} fulfils that pi(i) = i + 1 (or pi(i + 1) = i)
calculating mod p then (i, i+ 1) is said to be a neighbouring pair. In figure 2
(1, 2) and (4, 5) are neighbouring pairs. The permutation pictured in figure
3 has no neighbouring pairs.
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Figure 3. A representation of a crossing permutation on {1, 2, . . . 7, 8}. The
numbers {1, 2, 3, 6} form a crossing. Another crossing is {2, 4, 6, 7}.
The theorem I will prove - by drawing on a diagram - is that
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If a permutation pi ∈ Sp has no neighbouring pairs, it will have a crossing.10
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Figure 4. A proof based on a diagram: Choose i so that pi(i) − i = m is
as small as possible. Considering what i + 1 is mapped to one sees that a
crossing necessarily occurs.
The argument is as follows. For pi, a permutation in Sp that has no neigh-
bouring pairs, choose i in {1, 2, . . . , p} so that m in pi(i) = i+m is as small
as possible, see figure 4. We now consider what happens to i + 1 under pi,
corresponding to the dotted lines in the figure. Either pi(i + 1) is less than
i and we see that a crossing occurs. (i is already joined by i + m and the
map is one-to-one, so i+ 1 cannot map to i.) If pi(i+ 1) is greater than i its
value must be greater than i + m, since m was chosen to be the minimum
”distance” between any number and pi of that number. So again a crossing
must occur.
I claim the diagram used in this argument plays similar roles as described
above. First it helps recalling the formulation of the proposition. Seeing the
lines that cross allows me to retrace the steps made in order to formulate
the statement that a permutation with no neighbouring pairs has a crossing.
In addition the main idea of the proof, the choice of i, is indicated by the
drawing. Finally, following the argument and moving about in the diagram,
one sees that the conclusion follows, namely that the lines must cross. (I
am very sympathetic to Catton’s and Montelle’s insistence on the practical
10This theorem corresponds to lemma 1.17 in Haagerup and Thorbjørnsen (1999). The
lemma states that a non-crossing permutation has a pair of neighbours. The proof is by
contradiction, so one assumes the permutation has no neighbours and proves a crossing
must occur.
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aspect of following a demonstration or proof. Indeed in the proof just given,
one must, in one’s mind or on paper, follow the “constructions” made in
order to see that the proposition is correct. In general one may take a given
proof as instructions to follow in order to see that a proposition holds.11)
Moving to consider differences between the two examples, it is debatable
whether it makes sense to claim that the diagram considered individuates the
proposition. One objection would be that most propositions in contemporary
mathematics are not accompanied with diagrams. This entails that one of
the items used in Netz’s argument for the claim that a diagram is a metonym
for a proposition does not hold in general.
A further issue relevant when comparing the ancient Greek with contem-
porary practice concerns reading off information from diagrams. It was noted
that this was done in proposition II.11 as well as in the example just shown.
In this respect it is important to stress that it is possible to prove the last
proposition without reference to a figure (following the advice of Pasch in
the introductory quote).12 Indeed the argument just given is not the one
presented in the journal. Part of it goes like this: (As before) choose i so
that m in pi(i) = i + m is as small as possible. Next consider what i + 1 is
mapped to. If that value is less than i then pi(i + 1) < i < i + 1 < pi(i) is a
crossing for pi. If the value of i+ 1 is greater than i, it must be greater than
i + m because of the way i was chosen. Then i < i + 1 < i + m < pi(i + 1)
is a crossing for pi. I wish to emphasise here the difference between the two
arguments, that in the first diagram-based argument one sees the crossing,
that is, the lines actually cross in the diagram. In the text based proof one
states, using appropriate signs (i.e., indices and symbols), that the relation
holds. I shall return to this point in the last section.
The conclusion is that reasoning based on diagrams as practiced in Eu-
clid’s Elements is not exclusive to Greek geometry although there are some
differences. I observed that the diagram in both cases contributed to a rec-
ollection of the proposition, that it indicated either the constructions to be
11This feature of proofs is also described by Macbeth (2014, pp. 60-68) who characterises
the language used in such proofs as giving instructions on how to reason in contrast to
languages displaying the reasoning. Macbeth claims Euclidean diagrams are tools used to
display reasoning.
12Similarly Hilbert showed in his various versions of the Foundations of Geometry (build-
ing on Pasch’s earlier work) that it was possible to reason in geometry without referring to
figures, that is, basing inferences on axioms. This does not mean, however, that diagrams
are excluded from these books.
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performed or the main idea of the proof and that it yields understanding.
These roles were also emphasised in the quote of Pasch in the introduction.
In contrast diagrams in contemporary mathematics do not in general indi-
viduate propositions and I noted that contemporary proofs need not depend
on a diagram to the extent that Netz claims Greek demonstrations do.13 I
thus move to the second question to be dealt with here, namely whether
diagrams are special in terms of their capacity to point to new results. That
is, the question posed is whether it is possible to point to certain features of
diagrams that allows us to explain why they are fruitful. In order to do this
I start by considering the proposal made by Danielle Macbeth explaining the
fruitfulness of the diagram-based reasoning found in the Elements.
3 Macbeth’s diagrammatic reasoning
In Macbeth’s Realizing Reason, chapter 2, (Macbeth 2014) the perceived
fruitfulness of the diagrams used in Euclid is investigated. According to
Macbeth Euclid’s results, obtained by diagrammatic reasoning, constitute
“real extension of our knowledge” (p. 88).14 That diagrammatic reasoning
extends knowledge is explained by the fact that objects pop up15 as a result
of constructions made in the diagrams. Macbeth points to two ways of our
handling diagrams that makes this possible. The first concerns the reading
of (parts of) diagrams as iconic diagramsP . She argues that figures in Euclid
should be regarded not as images, signs that represent because of similarity,
but as signs showing relations. Furthermore she finds that this implies that
multiple readings is possible. Taking Euclid’s proposition I.1 as an example
(see figure 5) one may take the given line segment AB as part of a triangle,
that is, in relation to the shown triangle. On a different reading one considers
the line segment as part of, that is, radius, of a circle. Macbeth explains
how such alternative readings are realised as follows: “An icon of a radius
13Note that it is possible to find examples of proofs in mathematics where a particular
diagram can be said to individuate a proposition. One such example is the diagram
accompanying the Snake lemma. There are also examples of results in contemporary
mathematics that depend on diagrams as shown in, for example (De Toffoli and Giardino,
2015).
14Macbeth contrasts diagrammatic reasoning with ‘picture proofs’ that depend on mul-
tiple readings but are not fruitful in the same sense as the use of diagrams in Euclid’s
Elements. As an example of picture proofs she mentions Venn diagrams.
15Macbeth refers to Ken Manders who has introduced this notion, see e.g., his (2008).
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essentially involves reference to a circle; radii are and must be radii of circles.
An icon of a side of a triangle makes no reference to a circle. So nothing
could at once be an icon of both. But one and the same thing could serve
now (at time t) as an icon of a radius, and now(at time t′ 6= t ) as an icon
of a side. The familiar duck-rabbit drawing is just such a drawing; it is a
drawing that is an icon of a duck (though of course no duck in particular)
when viewed in one way and an icon of a rabbit (no one in particular) when
viewed in another” (Macbeth 2014, p. 89, italics in original).
A B
C
Figure 5. The diagram accompanying Euclid’s Elements I.1.
In proposition I.1 an equilateral triangle is constructed on a given line.
In the course of the demonstration one exploits the stated fact, i.e., that the
given line AB plays different roles. It represents the radius of two different
circles as well as the side of the constructed triangle. The second component
of Macbeth’s explanation is to ensure that parts of a given diagram, such as
a line or a point, may indeed be taken to belong to different figures relevant
to the argument. Macbeth argues this is possible since diagrams may be
construed as having three levels of articulation:
At the lowest level, then, are the primitive parts, namely, points, lines,
angles, and areas, and their corresponding icons. At the second level are the
(concepts of) geometrical objects we are interested in, those that form the
subject matter of geometry, all of which are wholes of those primitive parts
(and similarly for their icons). At this level we find points as endpoints of
lines, as points of intersection of lines, and as centers of circles; we find
angles of various sorts that are limited by lines that are also parts of those
angles; and we find figures of various sorts. A drawn figure such as (say) a
square has as parts: four straight line lengths, four points connecting them,
four angles all of which are right, and the area that is bounded by those four
lines. ... At the third level, finally, is the whole diagram, which is not itself
a geometrical figure but within which can be discerned various second-level
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objects depending on how one configures various collections of drawn lines
within the diagram (Macbeth 2014, 91).
The matter being investigated here is whether it is possible to point to
specific features of diagrams that explain their fruitfulness. In that light note
that Macbeth shows that shifts of focus and thus change of the meaning
intended also occurs in arguments that do not depend on diagrams. In ad-
dition something similar to different levels of articulation can be formulated
for proofs not based on diagrams. Among Macbeth’s examples of objects
popping up is Euler’s formula, eix = cos(x) + i · sin(x) found by considering
the power series expansions of the three functions, ex, sin(x) and cos(x). I
will present a version of this proof in the next section. As a simple example of
objects popping up, one could mention performing calculations correspond-
ing to the constructions of Euclid I.1 in analytic geometry. One places the
given line segment in a coordinate system, see figure 6.
B(1, 0)A
Figure 6. Placing the circles of Euclid I.1 in a coordinate system.
Let us suppose it has the endpoints (0, 0) and (1, 0). The equations of the
two circles can then be written as x2 +y2 = 1 and (x−1)2 +y2 = 1 and their
intersection point(s) be calculated. It is obvious the x- coordinate is x = 1
2
,
but this can also be calculated by noting the two different representations of
1 in the two expressions, that is, x2 + y2 = 1 = (x − 1)2 + y2. The corre-
sponding y-coordinates are ±
√
3
2
.16 In addition to multiple representation in
16In Carter (2012a) a different type of multiple reading of signs is described. It is
noted that mathematics employs ‘compound definitions’ that is definitions of concepts
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this example notice that the three levels of articulation apply. At the first
level are the individual signs used, e.g., x, y and ·. At the second level are
the different formed expressions, such as x2 + y2 = 1. The last level consists
of the proof.
3.1 A different role of signs
In this section I will present a proposition where a new object is constructed,
a group of permutations. I will note that it is possible to point to signs
that represent in alternative ways similar to Macbeth’s analysis. But more
importantly I will argue that signs play different roles in this example. The
example is Cayley’s theorem in group theory: Any group, G, is isomorphic
to a group of permutations on G.
Proof.17 Let G be a group.18 We have to construct a group of permuta-
tions and show that this group is isomorphic to G.
I give some details of the first part, the construction of the group of permuta-
tions. We construct such a group by the following. For any a ∈ G we define
the function φa : G → G by φa(x) = a · x. Since a · x ∈ G for a, x ∈ G it is
clear that φa is a map from G to itself. We prove φa so defined is a bijection.
It is one-to-one: If φa(x1) = φa(x2) we would obtain that a ·x1 = a ·x2 which
implies that x1 = x2. It is onto, since given any element, g ∈ G, we would
have that a−1g is mapped to g: φa(a−1g) = aa−1g = 1g = g. φa is therefore
a permutation. Now let Φ = {φa|a ∈ G}.
One may prove that the collection of φa’s, that is Φ, is a group under com-
position, so that it is a group of permutations.
Next we define a map between G and Φ, the collection of all φa for a ∈ G.
Define f : G → Φ by f(a) = φa. One then proves that this map is a homo-
morphism between groups and that it is injective and onto. It follows that
G is isomorphic to a group of permutations.
may contain several components. A simple example is the definition of a prime number
which both fulfils the definition of a prime and is a natural number.
17This proof is a modification of the proof given in algebra text book by Hungerford
(1997, p. 194-195).
18A group (G, ·) is a set, G, together with an operation · : G × G → G fulfilling the
following axioms. Associativity for all a, b, c ∈ G, a · (b · c) = (a · b) · c, neutral element
there exists an element e ∈ G such that for all a ∈ G a ·e = e ·a = a and inverse element
for all a ∈ G there exists a−1 ∈ G such that a · a−1 = a−1 · a = e. Note that I have chosen
to write the operation multiplicatively.
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Analysis of the proof illustrating the multiple use of representation and
in order to see how the object is constructed. The main object that is con-
structed in this theorem is the group of permutations, Φ. It consists of the
elements denoted φa for each element a in G. First I make a few notes about
different types of representations used in the proof. First note the use of ‘G’
and later ‘a’ to fix reference, enabling us to refer to the given group and an
(arbitrary) element of this group. In this capacity they act as indices. When
constructing the group of permutations, the letter a denoting an element of
the group is used in combination with a new letter φ together with a law
stating what this sign is supposed to stand for, namely φa(x) = a · x. Since
the meaning of φa is given by a law the use of the sign has symbolic elements.
But later in the proof, e.g. when defining the homomorphism between the
group G and the group of permutations, φa is used as an index, simply rep-
resenting an element of the group of permutations. That is, φa represents in
some cases as an index, and in other as a symbol.
An important ingredient in order to understand the theorem is to be able
to see the correspondence between the element a ∈ G and the permutation
φa in Φ. The particular choice of using the letter (sign) a to represent a
particular element of the given group and using this in combination with
the sign used to represent the permutation is a good trick to make readers
notice this correspondence. Returning to the alternative readings of signs in
the example above, that is Elements I.1, I claim something similar occurs
here. It was noted that an object (or sign representing the object) may be
read as standing in different relations to different objects. E.g., in Euclid
I.1 the given line AB is taken both as a side of a triangle and as radii of
two different circles. In Cayley’s theorem the sign a represents both an
element of the group G and — in combination with φ — an element of the
constructed group of permutation, Φ. That is, a stand in a relation both
to the group, G, (as a member of) and to a particular element of the group
of permutations, Φ. (In order to define the members of Φ, φa one needs to
refer to a.) Moreover, because of the group operation, elements of the group
stand in certain relations to other elements of the group. These relations are
drawn upon in the above proof. An element a in a group is, on the one hand,
related to its inverse, a−1, in the sense that a · a−1 = 1. On the other hand,
any element is related to 1, the identity element, so that a · 1 = a.
Having said this I also find that different uses of signs occur in this exam-
ple. First note that in this example the object constructed is not pictured. In
the examples given from the Elements the constructed triangle as well as the
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figures mentioned in proposition II.11 are pictured, so that these figures also
work as images. In Cayley’s theorem objects are primarily named. Letters
(functioning as indices) are being used, for example, to name members of
the group, and later the Greek letter, φ is used to refer to the permutations.
Second, since the objects are not pictured a different type of representation
is required to let us know how they are defined. In this case we are shown
how objects are defined in terms of symbolic expressions, for example, by the
expression φa(x) = a ·x. Third, relations holding between objects considered
are also given in terms of symbolic expressions. In Euclid I.1 relations are
exhibited in the figure and reported in the text, but not in terms of symbolic
expressions. I will return to these points in the next section. I mention a
final difference namely that in the above proof only relations actually used
are expressed in the proof whereas multiple irrelevant relations can generally
be read off the diagrams of Euclid.
As was established above proofs exploit signs in multiple ways even when
no figures are referred to and this practice is fruitful in the sense described
by Macbeth, that is, new objects appear as a consequence of the construc-
tions made. The conclusion is that it is not simply the possibility of multiple
readings of signs that makes diagrams stand out compared to text-based
arguments in combination with symbolic expressions. Considering Emily
Grosholz’s book Representation and Productive Ambiguity (2007) one finds
what appears to be a similar conclusion. It should be stressed, however, that
Grosholz’s notion of multiple readings (or, as she refers to it, ambiguity)
is of a different kind. She refers mostly to signs representing both as icons
and as symbols. Grosholz’s first example illustrating this ambiguity concerns
Galileo’s multiple reading of line segments. On one reading they are taken
(iconically) as finite segments and so allowing to use the results of geome-
try. On a symbolic reading they represent infinitesimals and so lead to the
notions of motion, speed and acceleration. She argues (or shows) that such
ambiguity is exploited in mathematics in general, that is, ambiguous reading
of signs that allows mathematicians to draw on different fields. Her examples
are taken from a wide range of mathematical fields, starting with geometric
diagrams moving on to, e.g., algebra, topology and logic.
Besides different functions of signs (e.g. naming vs picturing and show-
ing vs expressing), one feature appears to be different in the examples just
considered, that is, proposition I.1 of the Elements and Cayley’s theorem. In
Cayley’s theorem I noted the index a representing an element of the group
and that it is used in combination with a new sign, φ to name the permu-
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tation corresponding to a, namely φa. Comparing this double use of a with
the ambiguous use of the line segment AB, one may notice that the line is
located at the same place, whereas the letter a is located at different places
on the page. My proposal is that the fact that the line is located spatially in
just one place is an advantage for our understanding.
A few remarks are in place explaining in which sense ‘understanding’
is taken here. This brief description is based on (Carter 2012b) - which is
inspired by (in part unpublished) writings of Ken Manders, see e.g. (Man-
ders 1999). ‘Understanding’ is characterised as a relation between a given
subject matter and human agents. The subject matter in this case consists
of presentations of proofs. What is of interest to us is a comparison be-
tween the use of diagrams and other means (based on text and symbolic
expressions) of presenting proofs. When referring to understanding I am
considering whether certain (objectively statable) properties of diagrams are
advantageous in some ways as compared to what is expressible using other
means of representations. When saying what is advantageous we have to
keep in mind that we are dealing with human beings who have limited cogni-
tive abilities. An important component of Ken Manders’ characterisation of
understanding is control of types of responses (and a converse notion of in-
difference). A practice may be considered advantageous based on the types
of responses rendered superfluous as compared to another practice.19 By
stating that the figure of Euclid I.1 has cognitive advantages I suggest that
fewer cognitive resources must be drawn upon in order to see that the line
segment is part of, e.g. both the triangle and one of the circles. It is simply
the same line. In the proof of Cayley’s theorem one must actively construct
the relation that holds between a and φa, a relation that can be pictured as
a 7→ φa. The correspondence between the two is not explicitly shown by any
sign during the proof I presented above.
19As an example of a practice that for some purposes turned out to be advantageous, one
could mention Descartes’ introduction of analytic geometry. This practice has advantages
over the previous geometric practice. One could mention the fact that when performing
geometric proofs one has sometimes to make case distinctions, taking into account, e.g.,
whether an angle is right, obtuse or acute. That is, one may have to produce three proofs
whereas the algebraic proof takes care of all cases at once. One could also state that the
modern calculus is an immense improvement (that is, cognitive advantage) compared to
the various methods used before Newton and Leibniz. In calculus one has methods (e.g.,
computing an integral) that applies to any given (reasonable) function.
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4 Fruitfulness of diagrams?
I have found that diagrams in contemporary mathematics play some of the
roles as the diagrams are said to play in Euclid’s Elements. Furthermore I
have considered Macbeth’s explanation of why they are fruitful - and noted
that diagrams are not exclusively so. It remains to say something about the
peculiarity of diagrams. The first difference is already stated above, namely
exploiting the 2-dimensionality of diagrams to allow the representation of,
e.g., a geometric object to be part of different geometric figures. This is the
case of the line segment AB in figure 5. Another example is displayed below
in figure 7. The figure presented there may be used in order to determine the
value of cos(tan−1(x)). The angle θ corresponds to tan−1(x), so the sought
for value, cos(θ), corresponds to the length of the line marked by a (that is
OC) in the figure.
O
E
DC
A
a
b
x
1
θ
Figure 7 A diagram used to determine the value of cos(tan−1(x)), for ex-
ample showing θ = tan−1(x).
Having represented the relevant parts of the expression in the 2-dimensional
diagram, the next step consists of formulating relations holding between a, b
and x. Such relations can be “read off” from the diagram noticing first, that
a and b are the sides of a right angled triangle, OCA. Second one sees that
the same sides are also part of a triangle that is similar to the triangle ODE.
The equations thus obtained are
a2 + b2 = 1 and
b
x
=
a
1
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Notice here that the line segment named a (corresponding to cos(tan−1(x)))
is located only once in the diagram even though it is part of two different
configurations. This allows us to express two different relations. In order
to formulate these relations a shift of attention enables one first to focus on
the right angled triangle, triggering certain “category specifications” for such
triangles recognising it as a right angled triangle. Second one’s attention has
to shift so that one instead recognises the two similar triangles.20 That is,
the first identity is obtained by drawing on one’s knowledge of right angled
triangles, and the second by considering the two similar figures. Since the
relevant line segment is part of both configurations this shift of attention does
not compromise the final result. In contrast, when writing the equations and
performing the calculations in order to determine the value of a, a (as well
as the other indices used) has to be repeated for each occurrence.21
A second observation — the third mentioned point from Pasch’s quote —
is that figures enable one to show that certain objects are related. In general
one may indicate that a relation exists between two objects by connecting
letters denoting them by a line. Showing that a connection exists need not
imply that the type of relation is given by the diagram. The examples shown
here illustrate different degrees of explicitness of the given relation. In figure
5, showing the diagram of Euclid I.1, one directly reads off the relations of
the line AB to the other figures. In figure 2 and 3, showing representations
of permutations, the lines joining points indicate that these points stand in
some relation. The accompanying text tells us that they are to be interpreted
as showing the values of permutations. One could illustrate Cayley’s theorem
with a diagram like a→ φa for a ∈ G, indicating by the arrow that there is
a relation between a and φa. The arrow, however, does not state what the
relation is. The accompanying text lets us know that there is an isomorphism
f : G → Φ given by f(a) = φa. In all these cases — whether the relation
is explicit or not — is an advantage for our understanding: The role of the
20When referring to attention shifts and category specification I am freely using Gi-
aquinto’s (2007) account of a theory on visual imagery formulated by Stephen Kosslyn.
‘Category specifications’ is defined as a “set of feature descriptions stored more or less
permanently”(p. 108). A set of specifications for a triangle would contain that it is a
plane surface region and that is composed of three straight lines.
21The calculations done in order to determine a could be as follows. First b is isolated
in the second identity giving b = ax. This is inserted in the first giving a2 + (ax)2 = 1.
Isolating a2 one obtains a2(1 + x2) = 1, dividing by (1 + x2) on both sides and finally
taking the square-root gives a = ± 1√
1+x2
.
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diagram is to show that there is some connection, not necessarily precisely
what the connection is. It was noted, though, that in some cases the diagram
is able to display the intended relation(s). This fact gives rise to the notion
of a ‘faithful representation’ that I will try to characterise. This type of
representation may point to one explanation of why certain representations
are fruitful. In general, in the course of a proof, certain signs are produced
in order to handle the objects under study. (‘Objects under study’ may be
properties, relations, concepts or simply objects.) In brief, a sign may repre-
sent both as an image and as a diagramP (that is, displaying relations). If, in
addition, the sign may be produced so that it respects manipulations made
on the object under study, I denote the sign ‘a faithful representation’. I find
that these properties of signs, representation both as image and diagramP
and respecting manipulations, hold for a number of the cases presented here
— but not the main signs produced in the proof of Cayley’s theorem.
In the Elements I.1 the lines produced in the diagram (see figure 5) rep-
resent simultaneously parts of the geometric figures and relations holding
between points on these figures. That is, the diagram represents both as an
image (e.g., a triangle) and as a diagramP . Furthermore constructions — or
manipulations — are made on the shown objects, allowing us to discover new
relations among the parts. The main relation we are supposed to realise in
the end is that the constructed line segments AC and BC are equal to AB.
Similarly in figures 2, 3 and the proof of figure 4, representing permu-
tations on {1, 2, . . . , n} by joining points by a line, are parts that represent
both as images and as diagramsP : The properties of being a neighbouring
pair and a crossing permutation are both directly observed in the figures:
Neighbouring points are joined by a line (figure 2) and lines actually cross
(figure 3). So they represent partly as images. At the same time the diagrams
intend to represent these properties as relations holding between elements in
the set {1, 2, . . . , n} and so expressing properties of a permutation. As such
the diagrams also represent metaphorically. Finally we see in the proof that
“constructions” made on the diagram respect these properties, so that it is
possible to make a picture proof of the statement that a permutation with
no neighbours has a crossing.
Taking into account that signs used in mathematics often represent metaphor-
ically, the notion of a ‘faithful representation’ is extended to include represen-
tations that represent as a metaphor. To sum up, I denote a representation
a ‘faithful representation’ in case the following holds:
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i) It represents either as an image or as a metaphor.
ii) It represents certain relevant relations, that is, it represents as a diagramP ,
iii) Manipulations can be performed on the representation, respecting rele-
vant relations holding between objects, in such a way that new relations
may become visible.
For a final example, and one that does not depend on a diagram, I con-
sider a derivation of Euler’s identity, eix = cos(x) + i · sin(x).22 This example
is slightly different, but holds similar key features, in particular that manip-
ulations on the representations respect manipulations on the objects under
study. First Euler presented the transcendent functions as power series:
ex = 1 + x+
1
2
x2 +
1
3!
x3 +
1
4!
x4 +
1
5!
x5 . . . (1)
cos(x) = 1− 1
2
x2 +
1
4!
x4 − . . . and sin(x) = x− 1
3!
x3 +
1
5!
x5 − . . . (2)
Putting ix in place of x in equation (1) and using the relation i2 = −1 gives
eix = 1 + ix− 1
2
x2 − i 1
3!
x3 +
1
4!
x4 + i
1
5!
x5 − . . .
= (1− 1
2
x2 +
1
4!
x4 − . . .) + i(x− 1
3!
x3 +
1
5!
x5 − . . .) (3)
The last equality is obtained by rearranging terms and extracting the com-
mon factor, i. Substituting cos(x) and sin(x) in (3), one may see that the
identity eix = cos(x) + i · sin(x) follows.
In this proof the transcendental functions, ex, cos(x) and sin(x) are rep-
resented by power series. Euler considered the power series to be equal to
the functions (in contemporary terms one has to prove that they converge
to the functions in order to do the rearrangements), so they can be taken to
be metaphors of the functions considered. Second, because of the power se-
ries representations, relations between the functions can be read off from the
expressions. Third, observe that the signs can be manipulated, the terms
22Macbeth argues that the two functions cos(x) and sin(x) pop up as a result of the
algebraic manipulations made on the terms in the power series expansion of ex.
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of the sum are rearranged, so that the intended relation can be observed
in the final equation.23 In other words manipulations on the “objects”, i.e.
the functions, correspond to manipulations made on their representations,
the power series. I therefore find that this example also exploits faithful
representations.
5 Conclusion
I have explored the role different representations play in proofs with the in-
tent to say something about the difference between diagrams and other types
of representations. The question that drives this investigation is whether di-
agrams — or visualisations — are particularly fruitful. The analysis has
resulted in the notion of a ‘faithful representation’. A faithful representation
is characterised by its capacity to both represent as an image — or metaphor
— and as a diagramP , that is, showing relevant relations. A further require-
ment is that manipulations on components of the representation correspond
to operations on the objects represented so that new relations between parts
may be obtained. I have shown two examples of such representations (ex-
cluding the examples from Euclid’s Elements). The first consists in part of
the figures showing crossing permutations and neighbouring pairs and the
picture proof that a permutation with no pairs has a crossing. The second
example, done by symbolic expressions, is the proof of Euler’s formula. I
also gave an example of a proof where the notion of a ‘faithful representa-
tion’ does not apply, namely the proof of Cayley’s theorem. In this case the
main objects are merely named and not pictured. Furthermore relations are
mainly stated in words and so manipulations on objects respecting relations
are not shown.
In the first part of the paper I compared roles that the diagrams of Greek
mathematics have said to play with a contemporary example. I found that
the contemporary example (the one concerning permutations) displays some
of these roles. To mention two things, diagrams function as an aid in recalling
the statement of the proposition and they indicate main ideas or construc-
tions in the proof. These roles may also be explained by the fact that the
23Macbeth introduces a similar distinction. She distinguishes between languages where
one reasons ‘on the signs’ and in the signs. One reasons on the signs when the signs can
be taken to correspond to the objects one reasons about. This is what is observed in the
case of Euler’s formula. In contrast she argues one reasons in the diagrams of Euclid.
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diagram represents partly as an image.
Although the notion of a faithful representation characterised in this pa-
per does not exclusively apply to proofs using diagrams, I do point to two
roles I find to be unique for diagrams. The first is that it is made a cus-
tom to show that a relation holds between objects by joining representations
of the objects by a line. As noted sometimes the nature of the relation is
also given by the figure. Second it was found that the 2-dimensionality of
a diagram may be used to show that an object is related to multiple other
objects. This is the case in Euclid’s Elements I.1 and the diagram used to
find an expression for the value of cos(tan−1(x)).
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